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The Politics of the Green New Deal
JON BLOOMFIELD AND FRED STEWARD
Abstract
Covid-19 has highlighted our fragile relationship with the planet. But it represents a minor
challenge compared to the permanent havoc that runaway climate change threatens. Politi-
cians and governments—some at least—are beginning to recognise the scale of the danger.
In this article we assess the evolution of policy thinking on how to make climate transitions
happen; the potential of the European Green Deal; and how progressives need to shape it
and any UK counterpart to meet the challenges of modern society. The European initiative
arises from a broad coalition spanning the political spectrum. Yet, its central thrust of active
government offers the prospect of reviving a battered social democracy. We indicate the
openings here for a pluralist, ecological left. The run-up to the next global climate conference
—COP26—will be a vital period which will show whether parties and governments across
the world are prepared to meet the climate change challenge.
Keywords: climate transition, Green Deal, social democracy
FEW IN THE UK noticed. We were on the eve of
a tumultuous general election, but on 11
December 2019 the European Commission
launched its proposals for a European Green
Deal (EGD).1 The depth of the climate crisis
was becoming increasingly clear within the
business as well as scientific community; a
popular youth movement had emerged;
green parties had performed relatively well
in the European Parliament elections. During
that autumn the European Union (EU), fol-
lowing those elections and the appointment
of a new Commission and Council, had
already stated that addressing climate
change was to be its foremost priority for
the coming period. This policy statement
was its pitch.
The document was careful and cautious.
The size of the EGD programme, although
significant in EU terms, was relatively mod-
est. But what the Commission had done—al-
beit in dry, technical language—was to set
out the pathways to change. Responding to
the evolving scientific and policy agenda it
set out route maps on the crucial questions
of how to make the transition to a sustain-
able society. Rather than vague talk of a
‘green revolution’ or selective technology
hype, it focussed on the need to change sys-
tems and offered pathways of sustainability
transition in order to address the key arenas
damaging our environment. These included
the transformation of five key sociotechnical
systems—energy, industry, buildings, mobil-
ity, and food—responsible for the over-
whelming majority of carbon emissions, in
addition to managing the three major ecolog-
ical problem areas—climate, biodiversity,
and pollution. It wove these distinct ele-
ments of the climate and sustainability story
together in a coherent fashion, marking a
significant turning point in the relationship
between the traditionally separate policy
areas of environmental protection and eco-
nomic development. In broad terms it
reoriented the European process of macro-
economic coordination from growth to sus-
tainability. That gave a framework for
countries and cities to follow.
The coronavirus pandemic has provided
the rocket fuel to launch the programme.
Covid-19 has served as a stark warning of
humanity’s fragile relationship to the planet.
While there might eventually be a vaccine
for coronavirus, there is no magic potion to
cool the Earth. Only concerted, comprehen-
sive action can do that. After a chaotic start,
this recognition has jolted EU politicians
across the political spectrum into a recogni-
tion of the need to act collectively and at
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scale. The leaders of Europe’s four biggest
countries—Germany, France, Italy, and
Spain—representing a diverse range of polit-
ical forces, have led the way in calling for
major green recovery programmes. The
unprecedented €750 billion ‘Repair and Pre-
pare for the Next Generation’ programme
drafted by the European Commission pro-
vides a focus on the key CO2 emission
end uses of energy, buildings, mobility, food
and industry, and gives substantial resources
to them.2 Despite the protracted haggling
over the programme it gives an important
impetus to green deal politics and sets a
benchmark for others to follow in the run-up
to the next global climate change conference
(COP26) scheduled for Glasgow in autumn
2021.
Transformation of systems
At the heart of the Green Deal is the trans-
formation of key consumption/production
systems in the economy—energy, transport,
buildings and food. This is grounded in
transition policy innovations on climate
change initiated a decade ago. The UK Low
Carbon Transition Plan (2009) and the EU
Transition to a Low Carbon Competitive
Economy (2011) showed that ambitious cli-
mate targets needed to be disaggregated and
pursued in all of these specific systems.3
This precipitated a new alignment of envi-
ronmental policy with economic, industrial
and social policy domains. Transforming
these systems meant a renewed ‘hands-on’
public purpose for a wide range of govern-
ment departments. It also required new
coalitions of individuals and communities,
as well as business. Transitions to sustain-
ability implied a new type of transformative
policy and politics.
This idea had emerged in the new green
politics of the 1970s, which combined advo-
cacy of radical changes in economic policy
and social behaviour with high-profile acti-
vism around specific environmental issues.4
This challenged not only capitalist con-
sumerism, but also the redistributive growth
model favoured by social democracy. ‘Envi-
ronmental’-ism challenged the fundamentals
of ‘social’-ism. The political debate soon
became framed as a fundamentalist conflict
over the principle of economic growth.
The promotion of ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ by the UN in the 1980s attempted to
reconnect environmentalism with main-
stream economic and social policy. Intro-
duced by an experienced social democratic
politician, Gro Harlem Brundtland, it
embraced the ‘systemic’ interlocking of ecol-
ogy with the economy, while seeking to
move on from a growth/no-growth binary
divide. Its fate was to fall on the fallow
ground of the global shift to market-oriented
individualism, led by Reagan and Thatcher.
As a result, a new post-Brundtland political
narrative promoting a ‘green economy’ was
stunted by the new neoliberal orthodoxy.
The subsequent emergence of climate
change as the crucial global environmental
issue provided a more fertile opportunity.
The Kyoto Protocol (1997) bore the hall-
marks of neoliberal policy with its reliance
on market-based instruments of carbon pric-
ing and emissions trading. However, it also
dramatically awakened a new sense of pub-
lic purpose with the recognition that in order
to respect our planetary limits it was neces-
sary to set national, legally binding targets
for greenhouse gas reductions.
The designation of climate change as the
‘biggest market failure ever’ by the influen-
tial Stern Review in 2006 led to a growing
view that such a transition had to involve
public and governmental action, as well as
market processes, even if the prevailing
paradigm continued to favour the latter.5
Ambitious targets to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions began to be adopted by govern-
ments across the world, including the UK
with its 2008 Climate Change Act. This
reclaimed a role for anticipatory target-
oriented regulation.
UK developments were part of a wider
process of climate policy innovation at inter-
national and national levels inspired by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). This went way beyond the horizons
of the familiar market-led, small-state model,
which is why it aroused such vehement
opposition from market fundamentalists
such as Nigel Lawson. Instead, it implied a
renewal of active government to address
societal challenges through the transforma-
tion of specific systems of everyday produc-
tion and consumption. This effectively
reduced the traction of the purist,
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oppositional agenda within the environmen-
tal movement. Even in the most successful
Green Party in Germany, the ‘fundis’ lost out
to the ‘realos’.
Green New Deal—birth of an idea
Accompanying this new political direction
was an explosion of sustainability transition
analogies with historical episodes of transfor-
mative change.6 This was the context in
which the idea of a Green New Deal (GND)
entered modern political parlance in early
2007. The centrist New York Times columnist
Thomas Friedman renounced his earlier
belief that a ‘magic bullet’ Apollo-style mis-
sion could address the global dangers of cli-
mate change. Instead, he argued that the US
needed a huge project of scale as in Roo-
sevelt’s pre-war New Deal, which was built
‘on a broad range of programs and indus-
trial projects to revitalize America’.7
The unfolding of the financial crisis in
2007–9 gave this newborn idea a major
impetus. Starting with the UK Green New
Deal Group of radical economists and cam-
paigners, the period also saw green new deal
ideas expressed in proposals from the Ger-
man Green Party’s political foundation, the
European green parties and the UN Environ-
ment Programme.8 Motivated by the dual
dangers of the international financial crisis
and climate change, they endorsed Keyne-
sian alternatives to the existing orthodoxy,
centred on the belief that the government
should borrow to invest in a green recovery
programme.
Despite its promise, the translation of the
idea into practice was limited.9 The UK stim-
ulus package introduced by Gordon Brown
side-lined it. Barack Obama made it part of
his 2008 election platform, but the Green
New Deal was never championed as a
mobilising political narrative compared with
the traditional Democrat agenda of health
reform. The Green New Deal at this point
was an idea in the making. It was not
mature enough as a robust and consistent
policy framework, embedded within govern-
ment to be widely adopted in response to
the precipitate opportunities of the crisis. Its
saddest manifestation was as the label of
the Cameron coalition government’s flagship
home energy saving scheme. Climate Minis-
ter Greg Barker declared ‘the Green Deal
will be the biggest home improvement pro-
gramme since the Second World War’.10 In
fact, it set back domestic energy saving in
the UK: shaped by ideological blinkers, a
poorly designed top-down system con-
strained by austerity policy made the scheme
bureaucratically complex and set a very high
repayment interest rate on loans for house-
holders. Hardly anyone signed up. Effec-
tively, it sank like a stone but serves as a
warning to future governments.
The Green Deal: a ‘policy mix’
innovation
The Paris Agreement rebooted global climate
awareness into a new era. A cluster of
extreme weather events provided a real-
world backdrop to the follow-up IPCC call
in October 2018 for ‘rapid, far-reaching and
unprecedented changes in all aspects of soci-
ety to achieve a 1.5°C target’.11 The year saw
the birth of a new, youthful and impatient
climate movement. Greta Thunberg initiated
school strikes in Sweden, which spread
across the globe; Extinction Rebellion
launched in the UK on a platform of nonvio-
lent civil disobedience; the US Sunrise move-
ment rose to prominence in the Democrat
mid-term primaries
The Green New Deal was reborn in Febru-
ary 2019 as a package of proposed US legis-
lation linking radical environmental and
economic programmes, presented by Demo-
crats Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Edward
Markey.12 The initiative triggered a wave of
aspirational enthusiasm in the US and inter-
nationally. Its welcome by Friedman, despite
his own more centrist politics, suggested the
potential for a transformative politics with
wide reach.13 This breadth of political appeal
was confirmed by the decision of the newly-
appointed European Commission to launch
its own European Green Deal in December
2019. It too proposed a new coupling of cli-
mate and financial policy to put sustainabil-
ity at the heart of economic strategy. The
political leadership in this case, though, was
conservative and centrist rather than radical
social democrat. Consistent with European
traditions of moderate interventionism, it
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also reflected the recent nature of its politi-
cal greening. Fundamentally, however, it
expressed a deeper tectonic shift in political
terrain triggered by a new global climate
reality shaking old party certainties.
Despite the gulf between European and
North American discourses, and between
moderate and radical interventionism, there
are striking similarities in the novel policy
architecture shared by the two green deal
proposals (see Figure 1 below). Both of
them redesign and link three policy pillars
with standalone traditions—environmental
policy, fiscal policy and industrial policy.
This reconfiguration defines the essence of
the innovative green deal policy platform.
Firstly, the principal challenges of climate,
biodiversity, pollution and waste show a
clearer and more comprehensible framing of
environmental policy. To address the bewil-
dering variety of threats to world ecosys-
tems of air, land and water, they offer
better guideposts than the traditional con-
fusing medley of measures. They increas-
ingly aim for explicit targets to stay within
planetary boundaries, seek to address
human co-benefits such as health/wellbeing
and acknowledge their interconnections with
each other.
Secondly, a revolution in fiscal policy
recognises two new inextricably linked fun-
damental goals: to promote targeted finan-
cial spending on ecologically sustainable
investments and to require serious progress
on social equity and universal inclusion.
The third pillar is transformation of the
key consumption/production systems of
energy, transport, housing and food. Unreal-
isable aspirations for whole system transfor-
mation are resolved through a specific focus
on the sociotechnical systems mainly respon-
sible for high emission end-uses and ser-
vices.14 Advocacy of pet ‘magic bullet’
technologies makes way for a variety of sys-
temic transition pathways. Consumers and
other stakeholders are given attention as key
players. This displaces conventional sectoral
industrial policy. Manufacturing industry
itself is reframed as part of a transition to a
new circular economy.
Figure 1: Similarities between the EGD and GND
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The Green Deal policy platform chimes
with proposals for a new ‘sustainable transi-
tions policy’ with a wider mix of interven-
tions than just market-based instruments. Its
reorientation toward systemic solutions for
sustainability transitions, promoted by the
European Environment Agency, draws on
the policy insights generated by the sustain-
able transitions community. It challenges the
simplistic promotion of a handful of technol-
ogy winners as a feasible solution.15
An opportunity for social
democracy?
In the UK the stirrings of the left US Demo-
crats echoed with the homegrown legacy of
the earlier socialist and green advocates of a
new deal approach. A youthful Labour for a
Green New Deal was set up in early 2019
and a host of Green New Deal resolutions
were submitted to the Labour Party confer-
ence. A manifesto programme titled the
Green Industrial Revolution with a national
programme of green Keynesianism was
given a high profile.
The programme felt more of a shopping
list than the policy platform innovations of
the US and Europe. Nevertheless, its scale
and style resonated with Bernie Sanders’ $16
trillion Green New Deal public investment
programme launched in August 2019. They
both showed a welcome appetite for a more
serious scale of public investment and gave
much needed attention to social inclusion
and a ‘just transition’. As Adam Tooze
wrote, they have been a touchstone of the
revitalisation of the left and seem to offer a
route to the rejuvenation of social democ-
racy, battered by its endorsement of the poli-
cies of the Blair/Clinton era and unable to
address the inequalities generated by the
financial crash of 2008.16
The heavy defeat of Corbyn’s Labour in
the 2019 general election, dominated by
Brexit and the failure of Sanders’ presidential
ambitions, signed the death warrant of their
specific programmes. Yet, the Green New
Deal is shaping the Joe Biden campaign,
with Ocasio-Cortez on his Climate Panel,
while post-Covid economic recovery plan-
ning has put fiscal backbone into the Euro-
pean Green Deal.17 Given the fundamental
dynamics of the climate crisis and the eco-
nomic recovery, the green deal policy plat-
form is likely to continue to have political
purchase. This thinking spans the political
spectrum. It’s not just Merkel and Macron.
Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson
dubbed his major speech relaunching the
government’s post-Covid economic pro-
gramme in Dudley on 30 June as a ‘new
deal’ with the call to ‘build better, build
greener’. Many are claiming the mantle of
Green New Deal politics.
Green deal politics failed to cut through
after the 2008 financial crisis, but post
Covid-19 offers a second chance. There is a
greater consensus around the need for active
government and public investment to help
the economy, underpinned by a recognition
of the importance of equity to address issues
of inequality and disadvantaged regions.
This is moving politics onto traditional social
democratic terrain, even when it is German
Christian democracy and French centrism
that is taking it there. The politics of climate
transition needs to be developed on a broad,
cross-party basis, and it offers major oppor-
tunities for social democracy if it is able to
embrace a pluralist and environmentalist
approach suited to the challenges of the
twenty-first century.
So what can a ‘social democracy re-born’
offer? The starting point has to be a recogni-
tion that the climate crisis requires a re-mak-
ing of everyday politics, on the left as well
as the right. The nineteenth and twentieth
century model of high-carbon, fossil fuel
intensive economies, where the core task is
for ‘man to conquer nature’, has run its
course. To safeguard our common future a
new low carbon model of sustainable devel-
opment has to become the ‘common sense’
of the age. That’s what the policy specialists
and architects of both green deals have for-
mulated. Politicians and parties across the
spectrum are trying to catch up. The antici-
pated post-Covid green recovery pro-
grammes in the run-up to COP26 will show
which political forces are best able to trans-
late this thinking into everyday politics and
to make low or zero-carbon initiatives the
golden thread that runs through their policy
proposals.
The elements of active government, collec-
tive goods, and social inclusion chime with
TH E P O L I T I C S O F T H E G R E E N N EW DEA L 5
© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
The Political Quarterly
the social democratic tradition, yet it needs
to overcome the contradictory baggage of
utopianism on the one hand, and industrial-
ism on the other. A utopian embrace of an
unrealistic financial programme and a funda-
mentalist ‘no growth’ narrative would limit
the political appeal of the Green New Deal.
Ann Pettifor’s ‘Case for the Green New Deal’
offers such a mix. Its first grand mission:
‘nothing less than global financial system
change’ and the replacement of the dollar
with ‘an international currency independent
of the sovereign power of any single, impe-
rial state’.18 This is combined with a localist,
‘steady state’ economic agenda. ‘Let goods
be homespun’ is the slogan for a de-car-
bonised economy in which ‘we will not fly;
we will give up meat and grow and con-
sume local, seasonal, slow food. We will
make and repair our own garments’. This
may be fine for a long-term, eco-socialist
manifesto. However, a transformative pro-
gramme to address vital, shorter-term goals
on climate change is different. This is what
the Green New Deal can offer—a radical
reform programme to reach the targets set
by the IPCC.
In sharp contrast, the mainstream Labour
offer of a green industrial revolution is
marked more by traditional industrialism
than utopianism. The potential is there for a
new green Labour model but to realise it,
progressive politicians from socialist, envi-
ronmental and liberal traditions need to dee-
pen and modernise the existing green deal
narrative, as recently achieved in the French
local elections.19 There are four areas in par-
ticular where a shift in thinking is needed.
Firstly, it needs to adopt a twenty-first
century modernity. The green industrial rev-
olution should no longer be the metaphor of
choice. Nostalgia-laden labels of Northern
Powerhouse and Midlands Engine have been
promoted by Conservative governments and
happily shared by Labour. ‘Shovel-ready’
remains the favourite requirement for public
investment. They speak to a technocratic,
top-down model of traditional Keynesian-
ism. This conjures images from the past
while constricting the imagination of the pre-
sent and future. The potential of a mix of
social innovation and digital revolution to
transform ‘soft’ infrastructure needs to be at
the heart of green deal proposals. Currently
they play second fiddle to ‘hard’ infrastruc-
ture investment. Yet, new tech opens new
vistas. Cities from Manchester to Milan are
responding to the Covid-19 pandemic by
reconfiguring their urban systems. Digital
platforms and applications offer simplified
ticketing, real-time travel information, inte-
grated transport options and cycle and vehi-
cle sharing. A focus limited to public
financing of electric car ownership com-
pletely misses this. There is a vacancy for a
twenty-first century city mayor whose epi-
taph of platform socialism would be the
modern equivalent of nineteenth century
Joseph Chamberlain’s municipal socialism.20
Secondly, the Green New Deal rightly
stresses the centrality of jobs and material
sufficiency for all as the necessary co-benefits
of environmental actions. However, this too
readily slips into an implicitly economistic
view of people’s aspirations. The potential
widespread attractiveness of changes in life-
style through sustainability transitions—both
for individuals and institutions—does not
get a look-in. The fear of being accused of
preachiness leaves an unsustainable con-
sumption landscape uncontested. Telling
people what to do does not work, but life-
style changes are an essential part of a sus-
tainability transition. The transformation of
our consumption/production systems can
enable lifestyle changes that are popular. The
unexpected side-effects of the Covid crisis
have included clean air, less commuting and
hearing birds sing. In the medium term, the
mobility transition offers convenience, the
food transition offers health, the buildings
transition offers comfort and lower fuel bills.
The absence of positive lifestyle policies is a
serious political shortcoming which a new
green Labour combination needs to pursue.
Thirdly, Green New Deal politics seeks to
restore a significant role for working people
and local communities in the sustainability
transition. Yet, this can sometimes manifest
itself as a return to an old fashioned and
unrealistic type of class politics. The choice is
neither a simplistic model of business-led
green transformation, nor the suggestion that
the labour movement is the primary social
force to lead change. Pluralism has to be at
the heart of any successful green deal move-
ment. Successful sustainability transitions
rely on a wide alliance of social actors with
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a shared vision. The key challenge is to show
positive opportunities for new broad coali-
tions for system transitions which combine
environmental and employment benefits.
For example, in the buildings transition,
large refurbishment and retrofit programmes
should develop a coalition of actors represent-
ing building workers, city authorities, com-
munity and tenants’ organisations, banks and
supply companies.21
Fourthly, the twenty-first century world is
interdependent. We live in a world where the
local and regional overlap and are intertwined
with the national, continental and global. The
interconnections are all the stronger when it
comes to tackling a great societal challenge
like climate change, which is why centralised,
top-down methods are not the answer. Rather
than reheat an old, mission-driven approach,
sustainability transitions need a challenge-led
approach where national government speci-
fies the broad direction, but acknowledges
that experimentation around a diversity of
solutions must be nurtured with groups of
stakeholders at local and city level. The classic
big national projects find this very difficult:
they favour national ‘rollout’ with budgets
held in Whitehall and local authorities admin-
istering central government decisions. The
debacle of the UK’s Covid test and trace
programme has served to highlight the limi-
tations of this model of politics. Central to
the green deal should be transition pro-
grammes which set clear sustainability tar-
gets, but where budgets are devolved to
enable localities to design initiatives appropri-
ate to their needs in partnership with local
stakeholders.22
At the same time, no nation stands alone.
A post-Brexit UK will need to find sensible
ways to link up with its near neighbours.
The present government proposes a sharp
break from the EU, but a progressive alliance
should recognise the importance of cross-
border collaboration on the issue. Further-
more, Europe no longer sits at the centre of
the world and whatever the illusions of
Prime Minister Johnson, neither does the
UK. Green deal advocates require a wider
lens. There is no way that the climate crisis
can be tackled without the active participa-
tion of Asia; engagement with China prior to
the next COP26 is essential, despite other
areas of political disagreement.23
Thus new mindsets on the left are required
if social democracy is to revive by taking the
climate change agenda fully on board. The
UK menu of New Labour or Blue Labour;
Fabian centralism, or Bennite ‘socialism in
one country’ belongs to the past. Green deal-
ers in the UK, as in the rest of Europe, need
to welcome and embrace the pluralism and
diversity of the climate change movements
and recognise that climate change requires
citizen engagement at all political levels. For
a renewed social democracy to be at the heart
of green deal politics it has to create a new
model of politics which combines the social
with the environmental.
The post-Covid-19 opportunity
The urgency of the climate change crisis has
been growing visibly. Public concern has
risen markedly, while there’s an increasing
recognition of the global emergency within
the business and financial community. In the
UK, Sir John Gieve, former deputy governor
of the Bank of England, has called for a huge
investment programme with the Green New
Deal at its centre. Other powerful business
voices are urging the government to pursue
a similar green recovery pathway.24
It’s an important moment for the UK,
especially in its role as chair of the forthcom-
ing COP26 conference. The Prime Minister
has spoken in general terms about the need
for green investment. Ed Miliband, as Sha-
dow Business and Energy Secretary, has
called for a zero carbon army of tens of
thousands of workers to launch a Green
New Deal.25 Yet, big political doubts remain.
Are governments and parties able to make
the transformation required? The squalid
haggling at the EU Council summit in July
over Europe’s Green Deal showed how
easily visionary politics can get drowned out
by parochial concerns. The fact that two of
the ‘frugal four’—Denmark and Sweden—
are led by social democratic prime ministers
warns against any easy belief that social
democracy will lead this new green wave.
Furthermore, the absence of any mass pres-
sure at the summit—no protests, rallies,
coordinated letters in the media from influ-
ential players—highlighted the absence of a
European ‘demos’. In the silence and politi-
cal vacuum, old politics reasserted itself.
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What has been outlined here is a transfor-
mative vision of twenty-first century politics
that operates at the local, national, European
and global scale. Both the European Green
Deal and the US Green New Deal proposals
offer solid frameworks around which to
shape the policy ambition for large-scale
investment programmes to foster green eco-
nomic transition. The run-up to COP26 will
show which political forces are up to the
task. For the UK and European left, it offers
major opportunities to revive their fortunes.
However, to do so they’ll need to embrace a
pluralist and environmentalist social democ-
racy suited to the challenges of the twenty-
first century. A green social democratic pol-
icy framework is there, but it remains to be
seen whether they have the will and capabil-
ity to translate them into a viable politics.
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